Background: Reluctance of the multinational pharmaceutical companies to joinÂ the Medicines Patent Pool plan for HIV drugs (antiretrovirals-ARVs) might undermineÂ its desirable objective of scaling up long-term, extended access to novel, affordableÂ and appropriate ARV formulations in resource-limited settings.Â
Methods: This paper makes an analysis of conflicting issues and calls for a tradeÂ context facilitating a reverse of multinational drug manufacturersâ€™ reluctance to joinÂ patent pool. To this aim, partnerships between multinational companies are urgedÂ first to make cutting edge brand fixed-dose combination (FDC) ARVs promptly available, and secondly, to allow patent pool agreements to be negotiated immediatelyÂ afterwards. This context rejects clauses that exclude middle-income countries fromÂ sharing in the patent pool.Â
Expected results: The suggested trade context can help speed up the participation of originator pharmaceutical companies in the Medicines Patent Pool, whileÂ allowing them to maintain competitiveness, take advantage of incoming joint venture opportunities and circumvent the need for additional incentives. This contextÂ potentially tackles in an appropriate way the directions of evolution in emergingÂ markets, while bringing benefits to resource-limited populations, multinational drugÂ corporations and manufacturers from middle-income countries.
Conclusions: This study mixes analysis of health needs and of changing dimensions both in legislation and the pharmaceutical industry, with a political economyÂ focus that considers the interests and capacities of key participants in global HIVÂ treatment. So compounded, this study offers practical suggestions to stimulate theÂ current debate